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Summary
In the last few years, the Croatian Constitutional Court delivered several im-
portant decisions that significantly shaped interpretative approaches to con-
stitutional guarantee on the freedom of expression in the specific context of 
the public use of some symbols with contested meanings. Such developments 
undoubtedly deserve attention, especially in terms of particular tools that the 
Court used in defining limits to free speech. The primary focus of this ar-
ticle is directed to the issue of whether the use of contested symbols in public 
may be covered by constitutional free expression guarantees, and be therefore 
treated as the case of balancing process between them and some opposed in-
terests, or it should be subjected to stricter prohibitions, including their com-
plete ban. For those purposes, I am first presenting the relevant case-law of the 
Croatian Constitutional Court and then the cases already decided in a similar 
fashion by the European Court for Human Rights. In the final part I am pre-
senting some personal views on how a further structured approach to consti-
tutional interpretation in cases involving the use of contested symbols with 
historical meanings could possibly be construed in the Croatian context.
Keywords: Freedom of Expression, Free Speech, Contested Symbols, Disputed 
Insignia, Constitutional Adjudication
I. Introduction
Freedom of expression has been one of the principal guarantees of the modern Cro-
atian constitutional order ever since the adoption of the Constitution of 1990.1 Article 
1 The article was partially presented during the international symposium Hate Speech, Sym-
bols and Memories held at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb on June 6th. It 
should also be noted that this article was written as a part of the research project “The New Cro-
atian Legal System” (Law Faculty, University of Zagreb).
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38 of the said document in its present form thus combines all relevant elements 
of the concept. The general guarantee is thus strengthened with some specific ele-
ments: freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of speech 
and public expression; free establishment of all institutions of public communica-
tion; prohibition of censorship; freedom of reporting and free access to information; 
and right to correction to anyone whose constitutional and legal rights have been 
violated by public information.2 At the same time, like in the case of most other 
constitutional rights and freedoms, possible limitations to freedom of expression 
are subject to general criteria formulated in Article 16 of the Constitution. Those 
specifically require: that restrictions are prescribed by law; that they pursue a legiti-
mate aim (protection of freedoms and rights of others, of legal order, public mora-
lity and health); and that they conform to the principle of proportionality.3 But most 
importantly, freedom of expression has also, since 1990, been subject to additional 
and very strict constitutional limitations. Article 39 of the Constitution thus states 
that “any call for or incitement to war, or resort to violence, national, racial or reli-
gious hatred, or any form of intolerance shall be prohibited and punishable by law”.
Interestingly though, prohibition of “hate speech” and related categories men-
tioned in Article 39 of the Croatian Constitution has not, until quite recently, been 
subject to the Constitutional Court’s scrutiny (Gardašević, 2016: 160-161). In 2016 
and 2017, however, the situation strikingly changed when the Constitutional Court 
delivered four decisions which started to shed some light on the meaning of consti-
tutional prescriptions addressing the use of certain slogans or symbols which in the 
Croatian public sphere have for a long time been contested.4
Undoubtedly, those cases deserve particular attention. Accordingly, my at-
tempts in this paper are focused on presenting the major features of the Croatian 
constitutional debate, seen through the lenses of the Constitutional Court’s case-
law, as it refers to the freedom of expression in the specific context of the use of 
2 For the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in English, see: https://www.consti-
tuteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en, October 12th 2018.
3 Article 17 of the Croatian Constitution prescribes only a few constitutional rights that may 
not be restricted even in the case of an immediate threat to the State: the right to life, prohibition 
of torture, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment, guarantees on the legal definitions of pe-
nal offenses and punishments, freedom of thought, conscience and religion. With the exception 
of those absolute rights, all other constitutional rights and freedoms are therefore relative ones 
and subject to possible limitations according to Article 16 of the Constitution.
4 To be sure, I must stress already here that, apart from one dissenting opinion, the Court’s ma-
jority in the cases under examination actually did not expressly invoke the prescriptions of Ar-
ticle 39 of the Croatian Constitution, but rather reviewed the cases from several other constitution-
al aspects that I will try to present further. Still, those cases bear crucial relevance for describing 
limits to free expression in the overall Croatian context, especially in terms of the discourses on 
limits to “prohibited expression” as it pertains itself to the use of certain symbols.
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contested symbols. To that end, I emphasize, my paper is strictly focused on legal 
aspects of relevant cases or, more precisely, on their constitutional context.5
The highlight of my attempt is principally linked to the specific issue of whe-
ther the use of contested symbols in public may be covered by constitutional free 
expression guarantees, and be therefore treated as the case of balancing process 
between them and some opposed interests, or it should be subjected to stricter pro-
hibitions, including their complete ban. This specific theme is by no means new in 
constitutional law. As I will show more precisely later, the proposed division (i.e. 
limitations of rights v. general exclusion of legal protection for certain acts) actually 
reflects in important ways two major approaches commonly used by the European 
Court of Human Rights in cases involving the “hate speech” problem. Generally, 
thus, this Court in such cases applies either the “balancing” method as it stems from 
the limitation clause of Article 10 par. 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights or the “exclusion” method that is contained in its Article 17 (Prohibition of 
Abuse of Rights). 
This paper is divided in three parts. In the following chapter (II. Facts of the 
Case: Croatian Constitutional Justice in Practice) I am presenting developments in 
the case-law of the Croatian Constitutional Court relevant for the issues I described. 
Proper understanding of this case-law is indispensable for gaining a somewhat 
complete and clear picture on how the highest constitutional authority in Croatia 
construed its views on the delicate relationship between the free speech guarantees 
and the public uses of several symbols in the Croatian setting broadly understood 
as having contested meanings. In the third part (III. The Strasbourg Signals Recon-
sidered – The Balancing Method or an Outright Ban?), I am reviewing the cases of 
the European Court of Human Rights relevant for problems similar to those which 
have occurred in the Croatian context. This part is principally aiming to draw some 
comparisons to the case-law of the Strasbourg tribunal in terms of application of 
either Article 10 par. 2 or Article 17 of the European Convention. In the final part 
(IV. Conclusion), I will give some personal remarks on how a further structured ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation in cases involving the use of contested sym-
bols with historical meanings could possibly be construed.
5 For recent attempts to solve the problem of the public use of various contested symbols in 
the Croatian settings, see also: Dialogue Document: Postulates and Recommendations on Spe-
cific Normative Regulation of Symbols, Emblems and other Insignia of Totalitarian Regimes and 
Movements, the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, Feb-
ruary 28th 2018 (Zagreb). The English version at: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//Vijes-
ti/2018/05%20svibanj/5%20svibnja//DOKUMENT%20DIJALOGA%20ENG.pdf, October 17th 
2018. The Croatian version (including the separate opinions) at: https://vlada.gov.hr/istaknute-
teme/dokument-dijaloga-temeljna-polazista-i-preporuke-o-posebnom-normativnom-uredjenju-
simbola-znakovlja-i-drugih-obiljezja/23424, October 17th 2018.
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II. Facts of the Case: Croatian Constitutional Justice in Practice
As I already indicated in the introduction, the case-law of the Croatian Constitu-
tional Court relevant for the issues at stake here includes, at least, four decisions. 
In the Miljak case,6 the Court upheld rulings of lower courts in punishing the 
applicant who organized a public commemoration in favor of a well-known World 
War II officer. During the event, the applicant also held a speech in which he de-
scribed the creation of the Independent State of Croatia, the wartime career of the 
said officer and his unit. Moreover, after the speech, he shouted the slogan “Bog 
i Hrvati, za dom” (God and Croats, for Home). This was responded to by another 
person from the crowd who shouted “Spremni” (Ready) and raised her hand in the 
air, thus imitating the Nazi salute. Lower courts found that this constituted a breach 
of public order and peace and thus was punishable as a misdemeanor because the 
applicant, by his speech and shout, was inciting an organized group to behavior pro-
ducing intolerance towards others.
Technically, the Constitutional Court reviewed the case from the aspect of the 
constitutional guarantee of fair trial,7 but in the crucial part of the Decision, it poin-
ted to and accepted the findings of the second instance court that are directly rele-
vant for the problem of free speech. In that particular respect, the second instance 
stated the following: “It clearly follows from the provisions of the Constitution 
that the republic of Croatia is not founded on historical inheritance of the Indepen-
dent State of Croatia, whose prominent member was Jure Francetić, and freedoms 
and rights of the applicants as members of the political party Hrvatska čista stran-
ka prava (“The Croatian Pure Party of Rights”) in public expression of personal 
opinion in the concrete case are restricted by the Law on Misdemeanors Against 
Public Order and Peace, by its Article 5, and in accordance with Article 16 of the 
Constitution, in order to protect freedoms and rights of others and the legal order. 
In the concrete case the restrictions of rights of the applicants are directed towards 
a legitimate aim and they are proportionate... because the applicants were putting 
forward unacceptable political messages on which the Republic of Croatia, as an 
independent, sovereign and democratic state, is not based.”8 In addition, the second 
instance court rejected the applicant’s argument that he was not disturbing the pub-
lic because nobody else apart from those participating at the commemoration was 
6 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-III-1296/2016, May 25th 2016.
7 The reason for this was that the applicant himself based his constitutional complaint to the 
Constitutional Court on Articles 26 and 29 of the Constitution, and not on Article 38. Therefore, 
the Court was bound by this fact from the technical point of view. Nevertheless, as I explain in 
the main text, the issue of free speech was addressed as well, although in an indirect way.
8 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-III-1296/2016, May 25th 
2016, par. 4.
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present. Having determined instead that the commemoration was actually organized 
on an open town square, therefore on an unlimitedly open public space that is per-
manently accessible to an unlimited number of persons, the court concluded that it 
was not required to specifically determine the presence of other people.9
Soon after this Decision, in the Hajduković case the Court dealt with the con-
stitutional complaint of a person who claimed that there was a breach of his freedom 
and privacy of correspondence in a situation where the prison authorities banned 
him from sending several private letters. Those letters either contained the “Za dom 
spremni” (For the homeland ready) slogan or were specified to be sent to an address 
in the “Independent State of Croatia” or included insult or slander to the personnel 
working in the prison. The second instance court qualified the bans as pursuing se-
curity reasons, which included prohibitions of insult and slander as well as presen-
tation of forbidden symbols. The legal grounds for security reasons were located in 
the Law on the Execution of the Penalty of Imprisonment and in the Law on Misde-
meanors. The Constitutional Court affirmed the decision for the same reason albeit 
in a rather short passage in which it only briefly argued that privacy of correspon-
dence is generally subject to restrictions in public interest and in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality.10
The “balancing” approach can clearly be observed in the third, Šimunić case11 
where it was decided that lower courts did not breach the free speech guarantees 
when punishing a player who, shortly after the end of a football match, took up a mi-
crophone and four times publicly shouted the “Za dom” slogan. This was responded 
to from some within the stadium audience with “Spremni” and was heard both by 
those at the stadium and by those following the media covering the event. Conse-
quently, the first instance court qualified the applicant’s conduct as misdemeanor 
because, and taking into account the place, the way he did it and the communication 
he had with the audience, the message he thus conveyed was in its content inciting to 
hate on account of racial, national, regional or religious origin. The court found that 
the shout used by the applicant, as well as the response to it, symbolized the official 
salute in the totalitarian regime of the Independent State of Croatia and that as such 
the salute represented manifestation of racist ideology, contempt for other people 
on account of their religious and ethnic identity and trivialization of the victims of 
crimes against humanity. The same court also stressed that the Republic of Croatia, 
among other things, signed the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
9 Ibid.
10 This time, however, two judges of the Court wrote their joint separate opinion. See: Deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-III-5226/2013, October 18th 2016.
11 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-III-2588/2016, November 
8th 2016. In this case there was one separate opinion.
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Forms of Racial Discrimination and pointed that the same standing was expressed in 
the Sugg and Dobbs v. Sweden case.12
The appellate court reaffirmed the conviction and, like the first instance, paid 
special attention to the problem of qualification of the contested salute. The appli-
cant, backed up by an expert opinion, tried to argue that throughout history the sa-
lute has had multiple meanings. However, the court firmly emphasized that, despite 
other contexts, it was undisputable that the slogan was an official salute during the 
totalitarian regime of the Independent State of Croatia, that it was used on all of-
ficial documents of that state and that the movement which led that regime itself 
emerged from fascism, which was among other things based on racism. The conclu-
sion was therefore that the slogan symbolized hatred towards others because of their 
religious and ethnic belonging, manifestation of racist ideology, as well as underes-
timation of victims of crimes against humanity. The second instance court also re-
ferred to the element of the public space and pointed that the event was broadcasted 
through electronic media and that the applicant’s hate speech was accessible to an 
unlimited number of spectators.13
The Constitutional Court accepted all the findings of the lower courts and re-
jected the applicant’s constitutional complaint. This time, however, its reasoning 
was a bit more substantial than in the Miljak case. The Court opened its argument 
regarding the freedom of expression claim by stressing that constitutionally pro-
tected freedoms of opinion and expression were not absolute but rather subject to 
limitations prescribed by the Constitution and law and said that every particular 
case ought to be seen in terms of all relevant circumstances. This, furthermore, 
would include not only the content of contested statements, but also the context in 
which they were made public. And even more specifically, the Court pointed that 
any serious evaluation of such cases must take into account whether measures limi-
ting freedom of expression were proportional to a legitimate aim thus sought and 
whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The principal 
source of inspiration was found in the relevant case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights dealing with restriction of the freedom of expression, namely the 
case of Guja v. Moldova.14
12 Ibid., par. 3. Sugg and Dobbs v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights (2001). For 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, generally see the HUDOC database, avail-
able at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAM
BER%22,%22CHAMBER%22]}, October 12th 2018. 
13 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-III-2588/2016, November 
8th 2016, par. 4.
14 In the relevant part of that particular judgment the European Court stated:
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society 
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfillment. Subject 
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Applying those standards to the actual case, the Constitutional Court con-
firmed that the applicant was convicted on basis of the law15 and that the conviction 
represented an interference into his freedom of expression. At the same time, how-
ever, the legitimate aim of punishing conduct by which hatred on account of racial 
or other belonging was expressed or incited was found to be located in protection of 
the dignity of others16 as well as in basic values of a democratic society. The Court 
concluded by stressing that freedom of expression carried with it also responsibili-
ties and obligations and that the punishment of the applicant, taking into account 
all the circumstances of the concrete case, was not an excessive intrusion into his 
freedom.17
to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (of the European Convention on Human Rights – note: Đ. G.), it is ap-
plicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands 
of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. As 
set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which... must, however, be construed 
strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly...
(ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 paragraph 2, implies the exis-
tence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embra-
cing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. 
The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable 
with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the 
competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered 
pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to as-
certaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good 
faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case 
as a whole and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether 
the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’... In doing 
so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in con-
formity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an accept-
able assessment of the relevant facts...”. Guja v. Moldova, the European Court of Human Rights 
(2008), par. 69. The European Court of Human Rights in this case also pointed to other relevant 
cases decided by it before: Jer sild v. Denmark (1994); Hertel v. Switzerland (1998); and Steel and 
Morris v. the United Kingdom (2005).
15 Law on the Prevention of Disorder at Sport Competitions.
16 It is worth noticing here the similar approach towards the protection of dignity, as a legitimate 
basis for restriction, which is present in the German law. In that context H. Rose specifies that in 
the German federal Criminal Code “the general prohibition of hate speech does not require a mo-
tive to discriminate on racial, ethnic, or other grounds, instead requiring only assaulting the dignity 
of or inciting hatred or arbitrary measures against ‘segments of the population’” (Rose, 2014: 323).
17 For the arguments of the Constitutional Court in reference to Article 38 (freedom of ex-
pression) in this case, see: Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 
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In October 2017 the Constitutional Court delivered the last decision I would 
like to present here.18 This time, it dealt with the decision of a local body by which 
one of the streets in a municipality was named “10. travnja” (“April 10th”). The 
Court’s reasoning, in the context interesting here, started with determining that, in 
absence of any other proofs to the contrary, the contested name of the street could 
only be linked to the date of April 10th 1941, as the date of the establishment of the 
Independent State of Croatia.19 Following this, the Court then proceeded to intro-
duce the central element upon which it would construe its reasoning, namely the 
element of so-called “well-known historical truths”. Quoting the European Court 
of Human Rights from the Ždanoka v. Latvia case,20 it firstly said: “... the Court 
will abstain, as far as possible, from pronouncing on matters of purely historical 
fact, which do not come within its jurisdiction; however, it may accept certain well-
known historical truths and base its reasoning on them.”21 From that general point, 
the Constitutional Court turned to more specific explanation of the concept, as it 
was revealed in the Garaudy v. France case,22 and stressed the following: “... deny-
ing the reality of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust... does 
not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the truth. Having in mind that 
the Holocaust belongs to the category of clearly established historical facts, any ne-
gation or revision of it represents an abuse of the rights in the sense of Article 17 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms. In other words, any negation or revision of the Holocaust is contrary 
to the fundamental values of the Convention and therefore it cannot be under its 
U-III-2588/2016, November 8th 2016, par. 9-12. In that sense, M. Oetheimer notes that in Article 
10 cases the European Court applies the “closest scrutiny” test and clarifies the following: “Once 
the legality and the legitimacy of the interference in the exercise of freedom of expression have 
been confirmed, the judges review the content of the speech within the framework the so-called 
necessity-test. In other words, the Court will assess whether the free speech limitation was ne-
cessary in a democratic society and whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
In addition, the Court refers to a number of facts, which have an influence on the context within 
which the speech has been produced” (Oetheimer, 2009). It seems that the substantive part of 
the relevant “content” and “context” fact-finding in the Šimunić case, from the point of view of 
the required elements of analysis, was already done by the lower courts and not by the Consti-
tutional Court itself.
18 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-II-6111/2013, October 
10th 2017.
19 Ibid., par. 16.
20 Ždanoka v. Latvia, the European Court of Human Rights (2006).
21 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-II-6111/2013, October 
10th 2017, par. 17.
22 Garaudy v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (2006).
Gardašević, Đ., Historical Events in Symbols and the Freedom of Expression...
155
protection.”23 Turning then to the facts of the case at hand, the Court stated: “Starting 
with what was already said, neither the Constitution nor the Convention can provide 
any protection to the celebration of April 10th 1941, the date of the establishment of 
the Independent State of Croatia, in any way, including the cases in which names of 
streets and squares are given in memory of that date. In fact, the ‘well-known histori-
cal truth’ is that the Independent State of Croatia was a Nazi and a fascist creation and 
as such it represented the absolute negation of legitimate aspirations of the Croatian 
people to found its own state, as well as grave historical abuse of such aspirations. 
Therefore, according to the Preamble of the Constitution, the Republic of Croatia is 
not a successor to the Independent State of Croatia on any basis.”24 In a dictum the 
Court strongly emphasized that its constitutional standings were not merely related 
to names of streets, settlements, symbols and alike, but that they also represented its 
general standings on the character of the Independent State of Croatia, seen as nega-
tion of basic values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia.25
But the most notable part of the Court’s reasoning was presented in its view 
of the overall interpretative approach to the Constitution itself. More precisely, the 
Court stressed that the Constitution was not a value-neutral document, but rather 
that it affirmed Croatia as a democracy established upon the rule of law and protec-
tion of human rights and freedoms and that this was the only political model which 
the Constitution took into account and which it endorsed. From that point, in the 
Court’s view, human rights and rule of law are in the context of the Constitution 
primarily set up to express a moral commitment to objective principles of a liberal 
democracy.26 Moreover, the Court continued, the Constitution is in itself based upon 
some structural principles, among which and together with the rule of law one must 
also find principles of freedoms, equality in general and national equality, peace-
making and respect for human rights. In addition, abrogation or revision of any of 
those structural principles would directly interfere with the very structure and es-
sence of the Croatian state.27
23 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-II-6111/2013, October 
10th 2017, par. 17.1. For a critical view on the application of the “clearly established historical 
facts” concept, asking “to what extent will the (European – note: Đ. G.) Court expand the list of 
‘clearly established historical facts’, the negation or downplaying of which can be excluded from 
the ambit of protection under Article 10?”, see Arai, 2014: 624.
24 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-II-6111/2013, October 
10th 2017, par. 18.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., par. 19.
27 Ibid., par. 19.1. In a similar sense, E. Kulenović is arguing that the strategy of regulation of 
hate speech construed upon the possible concern for “erosion of basic political and social va-
lues” is “based on the idea that hate speech represents an attack to fundamental political and so-
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Consequently, the Court concluded that the rule prescribed in Article 17 of the 
European Convention was applicable in the Croatian constitutional scheme as well 
and that nothing in the constitutional order could be interpreted as a right of anyone 
to undertake a certain activity or carry out any act that would be directed to annul-
ling any right or freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. In conclusion, thus, the 
Court said that the decision of a municipality at stake in this case was in direct col-
lision with the rule of law principle, that it threatened the identity of the Croatian 
constitutional state to the level that could not be tolerated and that consequently it 
had to be annulled precisely because of the protection of that constitutional iden-
tity.28
Although it may be somewhat surprising that cases involving the public use 
of contested symbols (or disputed insignia) have only recently reached the highest 
constitutional authority in Croatia, it is a fact that the Croatian Constitutional Court 
in the last two years did give some concrete answers to the problems it was called 
to solve. Undoubtedly, the instructions of the Court bear a quality of constitutional 
precedents that, unless overruled, ought to be taken into account in future cases and 
analyses.29 I will now try to summarize the main points that derive from the case-
law of the Croatian Constitutional Court.
cial values of constitutional democracies” and that it is “possible to limit the freedom of expres-
sion when it is about public speech by which fundamental values on which democratic political 
community is based are rejected” (Kulenović, 2016: 44). In specific reference to the Croatian 
Constitutional Court’s standings that Constitution is not value-neutral but rather a document 
which shows commitment to the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedoms which 
in turn reveal moral commitment to objective principles of a liberal democracy, I find very in-
spiring the thoughts of J. Waldron in his discourse on a “well-ordered society” and the “appea-
rances” that society is reflecting in public. In that sense, Waldron is saying this: “The question I 
have asked – what does a well-ordered society look like? – is not a coy way of asking what makes 
a society well-ordered, or what a well-ordered society is like. I am interested in how things lite-
rally look; I’m interested in the visible environment. How important is the look of things in a 
well-ordered society? Is it unimportant, compared to how things actually are? Or is it an impor-
tant part of how things actually are? And if it is an important part of how things are, what in 
particular should we be looking for? The colorful, unruly diversity of a free market of ideas? Or 
the absence of visible features that are at odds with the fundamental commitment to justice with 
which a well-ordered society is supposed to be imbued?” (Waldron, 2012: 68).
28 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-II-6111/2013, October 10th 
2017, par. 20-21. This time however, just like in the above-described Šimunić case, judge M. 
Šumanović presented his own dissenting opinion. I leave further evaluation of the dissents men-
tioned in the Hajduković, Šimunić and April 10th Street cases for some future occasion.
29 Technically, one of the significant differences between the four examples I have described 
above is that in the first three cases the Court was actually resolving constitutional complaints 
of the applicants, whereas in the April 10th Street case it was dealing with the constitutionality of 
a locally enacted general act. However, in the light of relevant provisions of the Constitutional 
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As to the application of the “balancing” of competing interests method (free-
dom of expression against other constitutionally protected values) it may be noted 
that in the early cases the Court was only indirectly addressing the issue of expres-
sion, by principally confirming the standings of the lower courts.30 Quite broader 
and rather direct interpretation and application of the balancing approach may, how-
ever, be seen in the Šimunić case. Apart from that, a more thorough reading of the 
case-law reveals some other important points as well.
Firstly, in all four cases the Court was clearly dealing with the use of symbols 
which seem to share a certain historical or contextual background. In that sense, 
there is no straightforward answer to the question whether the pronouncements of 
the Court could directly be used in cases involving the use of other symbols.31 Se-
condly, as the Hajduković case shows, the presentation of some symbols may be re-
stricted even in private correspondence of the applicant, although in certain specific 
instances such as the prison environment. The required conditions thereof are that 
the use is subject to the proportionality principle and that it interferes with some le-
gitimate public interests, such as security reasons, which themselves are prescribed 
Act of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, the standings of the Court in all four 
cases, unless overruled by the same instance, must be seen as general prescriptions to be fol-
lowed in all future cases, whether they are triggered by new individual complaints or by mo-
tions for review of constitutionality of general legal regulations. In that sense, the Constitutional 
Act of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in its Article 31 par. 1. prescribes that 
“The decisions and the rulings of the Constitutional Court are obligatory and every individual 
or legal person shall obey them”. On the other hand, in reference to constitutional complaints, 
Article 77 states: “(1) When the constitutional complaint is accepted and the disputed act re-
pealed, the Constitutional Court shall state in the reasons for the decision which constitutional 
right has been violated and what makes the violation. (2) When passing the new act from Article 
76, paragraph 2, of this Constitutional Act, the competent judicial or administrative body, body 
of a unit of local and regional self-government, or legal person with public authority, is obliged 
to obey the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in the decision repealing the act 
whereby the applicant’s constitutional right was violated.” This particular fact has significant 
relevance for already observed practice of some of the Croatian lower courts which have been 
approaching similar cases differently. For instance, in the Šimunić case and yet another case 
in which the lower court came to a completely different conclusion in similar circumstances 
(Cvijanović, 2016: 104-105).
30 See the Miljak and Hajduković cases. It must also be noticed that in those two cases the Con-
stitutional Court technically reviewed the situation primarily from the point of view of either 
Article 29 (right to court) or Article 26 (freedom and privacy of correspondence). However, the 
“balancing” concerns in those two cases are also visible, either in references to the lower court’s 
argumentation or in its own reasoning.
31 Note here also that the general standpoints of the Constitutional Court in the April 10th Street 
case were exclusively addressing the character of the Independent State of Croatia as a negation 
of basic values of the Republic of Croatia.
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by law. Thirdly, as it emerges from the Miljak and Šimunić cases, the use of certain 
symbols in the public sphere, which amounts either to incitement to intolerance or 
hate towards others, is also subject to constitutional rules requiring prescription of 
the prohibition by law, pursuance of a legitimate aim for restriction and the propor-
tionality principle. Furthermore, public interests aiming at restrictions in that sense 
may well include not only the respect for dignity of others, but also the prohibition 
of “unacceptable political messages on which the Republic of Croatia, as an inde-
pendent, sovereign and democratic state, is not based” and prohibition of expression 
directed against “basic values of a democratic society”. In that sense, both the con-
tent and the context of the contested speech are taken into account. In specific cases 
the presence of others, and not only of those participating at certain events, might be 
presumed, if, for instance, the events were organized in an unlimitedly open public 
space that is permanently accessible to an unlimited number of persons. Generally 
speaking, thus, it seems that the Court in that particular context has not adopted a 
kind of constitutional review approach akin to the “clear and present” danger test.32 
And fourthly, the decision in the April 10th Street case marked the crucial switch in 
the approach of the Court, as it concerns the application of total “exclusion” from 
the constitutional protection rule. Instead of using the balancing method, the Court 
proceeded to a straightforward and complete ban, arguing in principle that any at-
tack to the very identity of the Croatian constitutional state may not survive its ju-
dicial scrutiny. The said case is therefore quite comparable to the Strasbourg Court 
rulings related to the application of Article 17 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.
32 In a quite precise context of comparative constitutional law related to freedom of speech, 
similar problems may be found in debates concerning which particular standard of constitutional 
review is the appropriate one for curbing expression. As summarized by Zechariah Chafee: “The 
real issue in every free speech controversy is this: whether the state can punish all words which 
have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts in violation of law, or only words 
which directly incite to acts in violation of law” (Strossen, 2018: xix). This particular division 
in approaches to limits of freedom of expression produced an extremely rich debate, especially 
in the United States. One of the most recent contributions arguing in favor of a restrained role of 
state in curtailing freedom of expression is offered in the said book by Strossen. For an almost 
immediate response to it, see for instance: Delgado and Stefancic, 2018. As Nadine Strossen puts 
it in very concrete constitutional meaning related to the case-law of the United States Supreme 
Court, the issue in setting the appropriate limits to free speech is about whether to use the “bad 
tendency” or the “emergency test”. In a similar sense, arguing about possible justifications for 
regulating hate speech, E. Kulenović is discussing the relationship between “direct harm” and 
“incitement to hate”, two categories to which he also adds “erosion of basic political and social 
values” (Kulenović, 2016: 33-49).
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III. The Strasbourg Signals Reconsidered – The Balancing Method 
or an Outright Ban?
I would now like to turn to some observations regarding relevant international le-
gal standards as they were interpreted and applied in the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. A careful observer of the relevant practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights may easily notice that this particular institution approaches 
the cases of hate speech in a twofold manner: either through the application of the 
balancing (or proportionality) method or by excluding the problematic expression 
from conventional protection in total. These two approaches, as already noted, are 
reflected in the wording of either the limitation clause of Article 10 par. 2 or in the 
general norm of Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights.33 On one 
side, Article 10 par. 2. of the Convention (Freedom of Expression) states the fol-
lowing: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” On the 
other side, its Article 17 (Prohibition of Abuse of Rights) prescribes this: “Nothing 
in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the Convention.”34
33 For a short but quite comprehensive overview of the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the hate speech cases, which I also used as a source in this paper, see: Hate Speech, Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (March 2018). Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf, April 16th 2018. For additional reviews of the European Court’s case-
law in that sense, see also: Oetheimer, 2009; Keane, 2007; Gardašević, 2016; Vasiljević, 2016.
34 For the European Convention on Human Rights, see: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf, October 12th 2018. 
In that sense, Yutaka Arai explains that the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law “re-
veals a variety of values which have been considered contrary to the ‘constitutional paradigm’ 
of the Convention” and specifies that the Court has to that point addressed not only the “typical 
examples of (neo)-Nazism, fascism, racism, anti-Semitism and (Stalinist) communism”, but also 
additional “variations of expression linked to Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and to aggressive forms 
of Kurdish nationalism” (Arai, 2014: 621-622). It must be noticed, however, that the formulation 
of Article 17 of the European Convention extends to prohibitions related to both private persons 
and states themselves, which makes it significantly different from other conventional provisions 
(Omejec, 2014: 1035-1036). In my paper, I focus only on the cases including the free expression 
guarantees of private persons.
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The balancing method in the context of free expression was most famously 
formulated already back in 1976 in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 
in which the European Court set the following formula: “Freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of (a democratic – note: Đ. G.) society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. 
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (of the European Convention – note: Đ. G.), it 
is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or re-
garded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘demo-
cratic society’. This means, amongst other things, that every ‘formality’, ‘condi-
tion’, ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.”35
In fact, the balancing method has indeed been the approach that the European 
Court used in two freedom of expression cases that might also be relevant for the 
Croatian context and particular problems it poses itself.
It was already back in 2000 that the Hungarian Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Hungarian Criminal Code in its Section 269/B that made it 
unlawful to distribute, use in front of a large public gathering or exhibit in public 
certain symbols that were defined as “symbols of despotism”, including the swas-
tika, the SS sign, the arrow-cross, the hammer and sickle, the five-pointed red star 
or a symbol depicting the above. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning was that the 
general ban was justified because it was only ten years since Hungary had begun its 
transition to democracy and the measure was aimed to protect not only public order, 
but also public peace in cases in which an act would infringe the dignity of a com-
munity determined by democratic values.36
In the Vajnai case, the applicant, Vice-President of the officially registered 
Hungarian Workers’ Party, was convicted in domestic courts of the offence of 
using a totalitarian symbol. In fact, during a lawful demonstration where he was 
35 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (1976), par. 49. See 
also the case of Erbakan v. Turkey, in which the European Court postulated this: “... Tolerance 
and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, 
pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in cer-
tain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify hatred based on intolerance..., provided that any ‘formalities’, ‘conditions’, 
‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’ imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” (Erbakan v. 
Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights, 2006, par. 56).
36 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, 4/2000. Available at: https://hunconcourt.
hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_0014_2000.pdf, October 17th 2018.
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a speaker he wore a five-pointed red star on his jacket. The European Court first 
noted that criminal sanction imposed upon the applicant did present an interfe-
rence with his freedom of expression, that it was “prescribed by law” and that it 
pursued the legitimate aims of the state in preventing disorder and protecting the 
rights of others. In further elaboration of general principles to be applied in the case, 
the Court highlighted that the test of “necessity in a democratic society” required 
proof of a “pressing social need” in curbing the contested expression, that “the rea-
sons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were ‘relevant 
and sufficient’” and that the “measure taken was ‘proportionate to the legitimate 
aims pursued’”.37 The Court also stated that exceptions to the freedom of speech 
“must be narrowly interpreted”, that “the necessity for any restrictions must be con-
vincingly established” and that “there is little scope under Article 10 par. 2 of the 
Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public 
interest”.38
In applying those principles to the actual case, the Court listed several impor-
tant arguments to conclude that there was a breach of the freedom of expression. In 
historical terms, it emphasized that two decades after the fall of communism and 
transition to pluralism in Hungary had already passed and that the state has proved 
to be a stable democracy, that it became a member of the European Union and that 
it fully integrated into the value system of the Council of Europe and the Conven-
tion. Consequently, there was no real and present danger of restoring the communist 
dictatorship. Further, in reference to the “pressing social need” element, required in 
cases of limitations upon political speech such as in the one under review, the Court 
posited that symbols with multiple meanings deserved particular attention and that 
any blanket ban on them actually has a chilling effect. This, in other words, meant 
that it could lead to restrictions of their use in contexts where it would not be jus-
tified.39 The Court took account of the fact that “well-known mass violations of 
37 Vajnai v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2008), par. 43 and par. 45. For an 
overview of the case, see also: Report of Judgment and Decisions/Recueil des arrêts et décisions 
2008-IV, the European Court of Human Rights (December 31st 2008), pp. 173-221. Available 
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/sites/search_eng/pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22applica
tionnumber:\%2233629/06\%22%22],%22subcategory%22:[%22e-reports%22]}, October 16th 
2018.
38 Ibid., par. 46-47.
39 Barendt addresses this particular issue in the context of the “slippery slope” problem: “... once 
racist and other forms of hate are proscribed, it will be difficult to resist the extension of the 
criminal law to ban the dissemination of, say, radical anarchist or socialist ideas. Defenders of 
hate speech laws argue that they are needed to preserve community relations and in the long term 
to prevent a break-down in law and order. But these arguments are difficult to accept. They are 
incompatible with general perspectives underlying arguments for free expression, that it is better 
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human rights committed under communism discredited the symbolic value of the 
red star”, but it added that the symbol had multiple meanings.40 As such, it could 
not exclusively be linked to communism in its totalitarian form, but should rather 
be seen also as the symbol of the international workers’ movement struggling for 
a fairer society, as well as the symbol of some lawful political parties active in se-
veral member states of the Council of Europe. Moreover, the Court found that the 
applicant acted in a lawfully organized and peaceful demonstration, that he was 
present there as the vice-president of a registered political party and that it was not 
known that he had any intention of participating in Hungarian political life in defi-
ance of the rule of law. Therefore, the blanket ban of the symbol was not acceptable. 
For the purposes of evaluating the aim of the state to prevent disorder, the Court 
pointed that the Government “have not referred to any instance where an actual or 
even remote danger of disorder triggered by the public display of the red star had 
arisen in Hungary”, that “the containment of a mere speculative danger, as a pre-
ventive measure for the protection democracy, cannot be seen as a ‘pressing social 
need’”, and that in any case in Hungarian law there existed less intrusive measures 
for suppressing possible public disturbances in such cases.41 Finally, in reference to 
the objective of protection of the rights of others, the Court accepted that the public 
display of the symbol could “create uneasiness among past victims and their rela-
tives, who may rightly find such displays disrespectful”.42 It, however, clarified that 
“such sentiments, however understandable, cannot alone set the limits of freedom 
of expression” and that “given the well-known assurances which the Republic of 
Hungary provided legally, morally and materially to the victims of communism, 
such emotions cannot be regarded as rational fears”.43 To this point, the Court’s 
general view was probably most clearly stated in the following: “In the Court’s 
view, a legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy 
the dictates of public feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting 
the pressing social needs recognized in a democratic society, since that society must 
remain reasonable in its judgment. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of 
speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto.”44 It is also worth mentioning 
for a society to debate its underlying tensions and that the state infringes the freedom if it outlaws 
the dissemination of ideas which the majority dislikes or which are offensive, even insulting, to 
particular communities” (Barendt, 2012: 903-904). For the same argument in defense from the 
“slippery slope” problem, see: Arai, 2014.
40 Vajnai v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2008), par. 52.
41 Ibid., par. 55.
42 Ibid., par. 57.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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that, following the decision in the Vajnai case, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
in 2013 struck down the above-mentioned Section 269/B of the Criminal Code on 
the grounds that it was formulated too widely, that it violated the requirement of 
legal certainty and that it disproportionately restricted the freedom of expression, 
without taking into account the motive of the act and the context and consequences 
of using the symbols enumerated in the provision.45
On the other hand, in the case of Fáber v. Hungary,46 the European Court was 
called upon to decide whether the public display of the Hungarian Árpád flag close 
to the site where a demonstration against racism and hatred organized by the Hun-
garian Socialist Party (MSZP) was taking place could justify detention and fining of 
the applicant. The applicant was silently holding the said flag on a location where in 
the Second World War mass exterminations of Jews were committed. After warned 
by the police that he should either remove the banner or leave, he refused and was 
subsequently put in custody and fined for the regulatory offence of disobeying po-
lice instructions. The appeal court held that his conduct “had been of a provocative 
nature, likely to result in unruliness in the context of the ongoing Socialist demon-
stration, and that his right to free expression could not be considered as reaching so 
far as to cause prejudice to public order”.47 Here the European Court had to review 
the case from both the freedom of assembly (Article 11 of the Convention) and 
the freedom of expression (Article 10) perspectives, and it thus combined general 
principles it had construed in its case-law as related to both provisions. In relation 
to the former provision of the European Convention, the Court’s general standards 
required that “the guarantees of Article 11 of the Convention apply to all assem-
blies except those where the organizers and participants have violent intentions or 
otherwise deny the foundations of a ‘democratic society’”.48 Additionally, the Court 
stressed that “the mere existence of a risk is insufficient for banning the event: in 
making their assessment the authorities must produce concrete estimates of the po-
tential scale of disturbance in order to evaluate the resources necessary for neutra-
lizing the threat of violent clashes”.49 Allowing that in cases of collision of compe-
45 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, 4/2013. CODICES summary of the Deci-
sion available at: http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/precis/eng/eur/hun/
hun-2013-1-003?fn=document-frameset.htm&f=templates$q=$uq=$x=$up=1$force=654, Octo-
ber 17th 2018. For another approach taking into account requirements of legal specificity of 
criminal law provisions regulating the use of totalitarian symbols, see: Judgment of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal of Poland K11/10 (2011), available at: http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/
omowienia/K_11_10_EN.pdf, October 17th 2018.
46 Fáber v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2012).
47 Ibid., par. 7.
48 Ibid., par. 37.
49 Ibid., par. 40.
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ting fundamental rights the states had a certain wide discretion to evaluate security 
risks, the Court proceeded to establish that such wide discretion was justified only 
“where the existence of a serious threat of a violent counter-demonstration is con-
vincingly demonstrated”.50 And in the instant case such a serious or clear threat or 
present danger of violence was not found because “neither the applicant’s conduct 
nor that of the others present was threatening or abusive, and it was only the holding 
of the flag that was considered provocative”.51 The Court actually said that “given 
the applicant’s passive conduct, the distance from the MSZP demonstration and the 
absence of any demonstrated risk of insecurity or disturbance”, the interference in 
his freedom of assembly was not justified, even though some of the demonstrators 
might have found the presence of the contested flag provocative.52 
In the strict sense of the freedom of expression issue, the Court opened its ar-
gument by saying that symbols which had multiple meanings and were used in po-
litical speech deserved “careful examination of the context” before “one can draw a 
meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected 
by Article 10 and that which forfeits its right to tolerance in a democratic society”.53 
Taking that “the expressive nature of the display of an object depends on the circum-
stances of the situation” the Court added that “the applicant’s decision to display that 
flag in the vicinity of the MSZP demonstration must be regarded as his way of ex-
pressing – by way of a symbol – his political views, namely a disagreement with the 
ideas of the MSZP demonstrators”.54 Moreover, since no “demonstrated risk of inse-
curity or disturbance” was found, the “pressing social need” for the police to inter-
vene could not be established.55 This led the Court to further examine whether, how-
ever, it was possible to conclude that the display of the banner in itself “was capable 
of causing public disorder” or whether it “required the intervention of the police” on 
other grounds based upon paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention.56
Assuming here the multiple-meanings quality of the flag, taken “both as a his-
torical symbol and as a symbol reminiscent of the Arrow Cross regime”, the Court 
then passed on to see whether “the display could have created a pressing social need 
50 Ibid., par. 42-43. In that particular sense, this case concerned the collision between the free-
dom of expression and assembly of the applicant on one side and the demonstrators’ right to pro-
tection against disruption of their assembly on the other.
51 Ibid., par. 46.
52 Ibid., par. 45 and par. 47. For an overview of the Strasbourg case-law related to the freedom 
of assembly, among other sources, see: Gardašević, 2011.
53 Fáber v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2012), par. 36 and par. 54.
54 Ibid., par. 52.
55 Ibid., par. 53.
56 Ibid.
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to restrict the use of the symbol, for the protection of the rights of others” and stressed 
that “in the interpretation of the meaning of an expression, for the determination of 
the proportionality of a specific restrictive measure, the location and the timing of the 
display of a symbol or of other expressions with multiple meanings play an important 
role”.57 Applying then the “location” and the “timing” elements to the actual case, it 
concluded that there existed no pressing social need for the restriction since the mere 
display of the banner was “neither intimidating, nor capable of inciting to violence 
by instilling a deep-seated and irrational hatred against identifiable persons”.58 The 
Court also added that “ill feelings or even outrage, in the absence of intimidation, 
cannot represent a pressing social need for the purposes of Article 10 par. 2, especial-
ly in view of the fact that the flag in question has never been outlawed”.59
Nevertheless, the final part of the Court’s opinion in this case presented some 
general additional observations as well. Those observations merit particular atten-
tion and deserve to be quoted in total. The Court actually stated the following: “The 
Court does not exclude that the display of a contextually ambiguous symbol at the 
specific site of mass murders may in certain circumstances express identification 
with the perpetrators of those crimes; it is for this reason that even otherwise pro-
tected expression is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. In certain 
countries with a traumatic historical experience comparable to that of Hungary, a 
ban on demonstrations – to be held on a specific day of remembrance – which are 
offensive to the memory of the victims of totalitarianism who perished at a given 
site may be considered to represent a pressing social need. The need to protect the 
rights to honour the murdered and the piety rights of their relatives may necessitate 
an interference with the right to freedom of expression, and it might be legitimate 
when the particular place and time of the otherwise protected expression unequivo-
cally changes the meaning of a certain display. Similar considerations apply if the 
expression, because of its timing and place, amounts to the glorification of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide (see Garaudy v. France...). Moreover, 
where the applicant expresses contempt for the victims of a totalitarian regime as 
such, this may amount – in application of Article 17 of the Convention – to an abuse 
of Convention rights (see Witzsch v. Germany...).”60
57 Ibid., par. 55.
58 Ibid., par. 56.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., par. 58. See also: Hate Speech, European Court of Human Rights (March 2018) (op. 
cit.), p. 8. For other possibly relevant cases of the European Court in terms of the balancing 
method in this context, apart from the decisions in Fáber v. Hungary and Vajnai v. Hungary, see 
also: Leroy v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (2008), and Féret v. Belgium, the 
European Court of Human Rights (2009).
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On the other hand, the European Court has in its practice also been applying the 
second approach, the one leading to an outright exclusion of conventional protection 
and embedded in Article 17 of the Convention. In this particular context, however, 
the European Court has set much higher thresholds to be attained in order to trigger 
the specific exclusion rule.61 It was thus decided that the Convention does not protect 
those applicants who, either in a series of articles or in a book, aim to spread ethnic 
hate towards a particular group or promote negationism and revisionism.62 The same 
was concluded in a case involving possession of leaflets addressed to the “White 
Dutch people”, which tended to make sure that everyone who was not white left the 
Netherlands.63 In Norwood v. the United Kingdom,64 the European Court upheld the 
conviction for aggravated hostility towards a religious group of a person who dis-
played in his window a poster representing the Twin Towers in flame, with the ac-
companying words: “Islam out of Britain – Protect the British People”. The European 
Court decided that the words and images on the poster had amounted to a public ex-
pression of attack on all Muslims in the UK and that such a general and vehement at-
tack on a religious group, linking the group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, 
was incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention.65 
It may also be noticed that Article 17 of the European Convention was invoked 
by the government in the previously mentioned Vajnai v. Hungary case. However, 
having distinguished the circumstances of that particular case from the case-law 
that the government relied upon,66 the European Court stressed several points: that 
here it was neither that the justification of Nazi-like politics was at stake nor that the 
freedom of expression was intended to be used by groups with totalitarian motives; 
that it was not argued by the government “that the applicant expressed contempt for 
61 In that sense, D. Keane (2007: 642) is stressing that “the Court has a higher standard of pro-
tection against Holocaust denial and related questioning of the historical facts of World War 
II, which it will attack directly under Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), than other forms of racist or hate speech, which are examined under Article 10”.
62 See: Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights (2007); Garaudy v. France, 
the European Court of Human Rights (2003).
63 Glimmerveen and Haqenbeek v. the Netherlands, the European Commission of Human 
Rights (1979).
64 Norwood v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (2004).
65 Ibid. For an overview of the case, see also: Report of Judgment and Decisions/Recueil des 
arrêts et décisions 2004-XI, the European Court of Human Rights (December 31st 2004), pp. 
173-221. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2004-XI.pdf, Oc-
tober 17th 2018.
66 The government, among other cases, pointed in this respect to Garaudy v. France, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (2006), and Lehideux and Isorni v. France, the European Court of 
Human Rights (1998). 
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the victims of a totalitarian regime or belonged to a group with totalitarian ambi-
tions”; and that it cannot be concluded that the display of the symbol was intended 
to justify or propagate totalitarian oppression serving “totalitarian groups”. The ap-
plicant was, according to the Court, rather wearing a symbol of lawful left-wing 
political movements. Therefore, the Article 17 claim failed.67
Finally, although the Sugg and Dobbs v. Sweden case68 was not really an ex-
ample of application of Article 17 of the Convention, it deserves special mention 
here. A good reason for it is that the case is directly relevant for possible further re-
thinking of the guidelines set up, for instance, in the Vajnai v. Hungary and Fáber v. 
Hungary cases. In Sugg and Dobbs national courts convicted the applicants because 
they had raised their hands in the air during a rock concert, thus imitating the so-
called “Hitler salutes”, and had been shouting the words “Sieg heil”. The European 
Court found that the conduct of the applicants was well qualified by the national 
court as constituting an offence under the Swedish law. In its reasoning it stressed 
that, in applying the relevant provision of the Penal Code to the case, the national 
Court of Appeals “... had regard to the travaux préparatoires to that provision and to 
a judgment by the Supreme Court of 17 October 1996 concerning the use of Nazi 
symbols and concluded that the ‘Hitler salute’ and the words ‘Sieg heil’ were clear 
manifestations of Nazism and racist ideology and expressed contempt for other per-
sons on account of their race or colour”.69
IV. Conclusion
As I said at the outset, my primary concern in this paper was to examine which spe-
cific types of speech may be covered by constitutional free expression guarantees, 
and be therefore treated as the case of balancing process between them and some op-
posed public and private interests, and which should be subjected to a complete ban. 
I hope that in the foregoing text I have managed to show what I believe are the rele-
vant elements for a more detailed understanding of that particular problem both in the 
Croatian and in the European contexts. For this purpose, I have drawn some elements 
of the analysis as they stem from two high judicial authorities, the Croatian Consti-
tutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. However, there still remain 
some additional observations I think might be relevant for a possible more compre-
hensive approach to future constitutional interpretation in the Croatian settings.
Undoubtedly, the review of the relevant case-law which I have presented ear-
lier does not cover all the examples which fall under the exclusion rule, as it is 
67 Vajnai v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2008), par. 20-26.
68 Sugg and Dobbs v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights (2001).
69 Ibid.
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presented in Article 17 of the European Convention.70 The list thereof is far more 
extensive and in my paper I just focused on those cases of both high instances that 
may have relevance for the freedom of expression as it refers to the use of sym-
bols with some contested meanings. Additionally, and that goes particularly for the 
Strasbourg case-law, much of what I have shown is often seen merely in the context 
of “hate speech”. However, this seems to be just one part of the problem.
In that respect, it must be added that the specific issue of the public use of con-
tested symbols exceeds strict boundaries of the hate speech problem as such and 
enters into some other particular constitutional contexts that also deserve atten-
tion. More precisely, similar constitutional philosophy may be observed in those 
approaches which forbid the activities that aim at destroying certain core values or 
principles upon which constitutional and public orders are based. Generally speak-
ing, this is exactly the field of values having fundamental meaning for the overall 
construction of a constitutional document. Once again, the best example of that ap-
proach is seen in the wording of Article 17 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, but the list of relevant references thereof includes also other legal sources, 
such as, for instance, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,71 or 
various constitutional texts.72 In purely theoretical terms, the same concerns might 
70 For a comprehensive list of the European Court of Human Rights’ cases dealing with the 
problem of hate speech, both those including the application of Article 14 and those including 
Article 17 of the European Convention, see: Hate Speech, European Court of Human Rights 
(March 2018).
71 See Article 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Prohibition of 
Abuse of Rights). For the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union see: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL&from=EN, 
October 12th 2018.
72 For instance, in the German Basic Law of 1949 the freedom of expression, as well as its ge-
neral limitations, are defined in Article 5. On the other hand, Article 18 of the Basic Law (Forfei-
ture of Basic Rights) posits the following: “Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in par-
ticular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph 
(3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the 
privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property 
(Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic 
order shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Fede-
ral Constitutional Court.” See: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/German_Federal_
Republic_2014?lang=en, October 12th 2018. See also Article 25 par. 3 of the Greek Constitution 
which states: “The abusive exercise of rights is not permitted.” On different meanings of Article 
17 of the European Convention and Article 54 of the Charter on one side (being seen as inter-
pretative norms which makes their application possible in relation to all other rights in the said 
documents) and Article 18 of the German Basic Law (understood as a structural norm linked to 
rather specific, enumerated rights), see: Mock and Demuro, 2010.
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be traced well back to Karl Loewenstein’s classical text on militant democracy and 
fundamental rights (Loewenstein, 1937a; 1937b).73
It seems that this is quite close to the point of discussion which the Croatian 
Constitutional Court has already reached in its overall discourse on the concepts of 
“the basic values of a democratic society”74 on one hand and “the structural princi-
ples” upon which “the very structure and essence of the Croatian state” or its “con-
stitutional identity” are founded on the other.75 I must stress that the “constitutional 
identity” concept as such is not an entire novelty in Croatian constitutional law. For 
some time now, it has attracted the attention of both the Constitutional Court itself 
and several domestic scholars.76 What is of utmost significance here is the fact that 
the Croatian Constitutional Court used the concept as one of the central benchmarks 
of review in the April 10th Street case.
Yet another element taken as relevant by the Court in the same case was the 
application of the Preamble to the Croatian Constitution.77 Although, comparatively 
speaking, there might be some differences in views about possible “incorporation” 
of preambles into constitutional texts for specific purposes of invoking their word-
73 In that particular sense, H. Cvijanović puts the American and the European approaches to 
curbing of hate speech in opposition and stresses that K. Lowenstein, “who influenced the cre-
ation of the speech space in Europe after the Second World War”, took that “the militant demo-
cracy stems from the perception on weakness of the European democratic institutions which it-
self was used by fascist movements” and thus “argued in favor of repressive measures against 
antidemocratic movements as the defense of the European democracy” (Cvijanović, 2016: 80). 
For other sources relevant for a general overview of the “militant democracy” concept, see also: 
Sajó, 2014; Gardašević, 2014; Smerdel, 2013; Kostadinov, 2011.
74 The Šimunić case. 
75 The April 10th Street case.
76 For a broader view on the concept of “constitutional identity” in the Croatian constitutio-
nal doctrine, see also: Smerdel, 2013; 2014; Kostadinov, 2011; Gardašević, 2014; Toplak and 
Gardašević, 2017; Rodin, 2012; Horvat Vuković, 2014; Podolnjak and Smerdel, 2014. For dis-
tinctive foreign perspectives on the concept of constitutional identity, see also: Rosenfeld, 2010; 
Jacobsohn, 2010.
77 It is worth repeating here what the Constitutional Court actually stated in this particular sense: 
“Starting with what was already said, neither the Constitution nor the Convention can provide 
any protection to the celebration of April 10th 1941, the date of the establishment of the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia, in any way, including the cases in which names of streets and squares 
are given in memory of that date. In fact, the ‘well-known historical truth’ is that the Independent 
State of Croatia was a Nazi and a fascist creation and as such it represented the absolute negation 
of legitimate aspirations of the Croatian people to found its own state, as well as grave historical 
abuse of such aspirations. Therefore, according to the Preamble of the Constitution, the Repub-
lic of Croatia is not a successor to the Independent State of Croatia on any basis.” See: the April 
10th Street case.
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ing in resolving the actual cases,78 it is also a fact that the Croatian Constitutional 
Court has accepted the positive answer to that point. In other words, in our consti-
tutional setting, the Preamble of the Constitution is indeed taken as a valid resource 
of references. And even more importantly, the Preamble, although not in its entirety, 
has already been made part of the “constitutional identity” concept.79
Therefore, the central question for future analyses is this: how can one possibly 
read the Preamble of the Croatian Constitution in the specific context of the public 
use of contested symbols? Some critical answers to that question have already been 
offered.80 In an attempt to present more material for prospective discussions and a 
more comprehensive approach to constitutional interpretation, I will now just brief-
ly offer some of my personal views.
From the point of view of contested symbols or disputed insignia, as it reveals 
itself in the Croatian context, it seems that by far the most relevant references are 
found in those parts of the Preamble which mention the regimes that either had al-
ready existed or started to exist during the Second World War. That an inevitable 
need for strict distinctions thereof is, however, indispensable, may be argued from 
at least two important points. The first one is intrinsically linked to both the literal 
and the more strictly “constitutional” reading of the text of the Preamble. In that 
particular sense, it does not only matter which literal constitutional prescriptions the 
Preamble uses in terms of the particular views it takes towards the past.81 It is also 
78 For the views opposing the conclusion that the Preamble to the Constitution of the United 
States may have direct relevance, see both the standings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905), and the words of Joseph Story who argued: 
“The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general govern-
ment, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se; it can never amount, by im-
plication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source 
of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution” (Story, 1833: 164). On 
the other hand, the French approach in interpreting constitutional preambles is somewhat diffe-
rent. The Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution is now taken as part of the so-called “block 
of constitutionality”, meaning that it has an equal value to other con stitutional sources that may 
serve as grounds for reviewing the constitutionality of laws. In other words, the 1946 Preamble 
is not merely a declaratory text.
79 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, U-I-3597/2010, July 29th 
2011, par. 30.1. In that Decision, however, the Court “incorporated” only that part of the Pream-
ble which refers to the concept of national sovereignty and to the equal protection of national 
minorities. It is therefore of utmost significance to see whether other parts of the Preamble will 
in future also be thus incorporated. This undoubtedly bears significant meaning for the discourse 
on the public use of contested symbols as well.
80 See the separate opinion of judge M. Šumanović in the April 10th Street case.
81 In fact, specifying those historical events which laid foundations for the re-establishment of 
the Croatian state and national sovereignty in 1990, the Preamble among other things clearly 
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important to note that significant differences thereof also exist in the context of how 
the inheritance of that past was once overcome in the strict meaning of the constitu-
tional procedure thus undertaken.82
The second, and my final point here is that some rather important lessons should 
be drawn from the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. As I 
have already shown, that Court has quite firmly established the criteria upon which 
some contested symbols of the past may be evaluated. The relevant reasoning there-
of, for the purposes of understanding the European perspective, pertains to three 
distinguishable types of symbols. The first category includes the symbols which 
may not be denied conventional protection, unless directly provoking some tangi-
ble harm that fulfills the requirement of the “pressing social need” for restrictions. 
Those symbols are also distinctive as to their position in the overall international 
context. The second category is related to the symbols that are similar to the first 
ones, but are at the same time devoid of any other internationally recognized mean-
ing that would provide an additional presumption in terms of their constitutional 
validity. And the third category is reserved for symbols with an outright and purely 
unambiguous meaning.
Needless to say, the European Court of Human Rights’ material relevant for 
further analyses in that context includes, in that particular order, the decisions in 
Vajnai v. Hungary, Fáber v. Hungary and Sugg and Dobbs v. Sweden cases.
points to the decisions of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (1943), as 
well as to the subsequent Constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia (1947) and all later 
constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990). Contrary to that, the proclamation 
of the Independent State of Croatia (1941) is explicitly rejected as any possible constitutional re-
ference thereof. In a comparable, but rather broader context of historical experiences of different 
states, Barendt argues: “... each country has a distinct historical experience of the dangers of hate 
speech. On that basis it is understandable that after the apartheid regime the framers of the South 
African Constitution decided wholly to exclude hate speech from the free expression guarantee. 
Equally, Holocaust denial laws make sense in countries which have recently experienced Nazi 
and other anti-Semitic regimes or in which there is good reason to believe that, left unchecked, 
the fabrications of revisionist historians will be widely accepted. But with the passage of time, 
it would surely be wrong for the state to determine historical truth; a law banning the publica-
tion of ‘revisionist’ histories of the atrocities committed by religious communities, say, during 
the Crusades or the Thirty Years War, would infringe freedom of expression, however insulting 
these accounts are to their members now” (Barendt, 2012: 904).
82 To that particular point, it does matter to see whether certain past regimes were explicitly reject-
ed as having any constitutional reference at all or they were replaced by new ones through properly 
conducted constitutional processes. Even more precisely, the 1990 Constitution of the Republic 
of Croatia was enacted through a regular and legally prescribed constitution-making procedure.
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